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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
It has become increasingly critical that Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition 
managers acquire technologically superior weapon systems within fixed periods with 
minimal resources. One successful Air Defense acquisition was the Avenger program, 
which utilized a Non-developmental Item (NDI) acquisition strategy. The SGT York also 
utilized an NDI acquisition strategy but ended as a failed program. 
There are two characteristics that make study of the Avenger and SGT York 
programs interesting. The first characteristic is the success that the Avenger NDI program 
has enjoyed versus the troubled SGT York NDI program. Both systems used proven and 
reliable components, but one was a great success and the other a failure. 
The second characteristic is that the Avenger and the SGT York both used 
accelerated acquisition strategies. The Avenger Program went from Milestone III to its 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in approximately 2.5 years, whereas SGT York was 
already 4.5 years past Milestone III and never reached its IOC prior to its cancellation. 
This Thesis will utilize the definition of an acquisition strategy as defined by DOD 
5000.2 to look at the acquisition programs of SGT York and Avenger. DOD 5000.2 
defines acquisition strategy as: 
A combination of business and technical management concepts designed 
to achieve program objectives within imposed resource constraints. It is 
the framework for managing research, development, test, production, 
fielding support and other essential program activities.   [Ref. l:p. 15-2] 
Additionally, this thesis will look at other key factors that affected each program's 
success. These factors are not all inclusive. These factors are the most critical as seen 
by the Author. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the failed acquisition program of the SGT 
York Gun System and the successful acquisition program of the Avenger Air Defense 
System.   From this examination, lessons-learned will be identified that will help other 
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acquisition managers to more effectively manage all future air defense system acquisition 
programs. These lessons-learned will also be beneficial for students studying acquisition 
management. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following primary research questions were addressed in pursuing the 
objectives of this thesis: What are the major factors of the SGT York and Avenger 
acquisition programs that made the SGT York a failure and Avenger a success? What 
lessons can be learned from these factors that can be applied to other acquisition 
programs? 
The subsidiary questions used to aid in determining the answers to the primary 
questions were: 
1. What made the SGT York acquisition program a failure and what were the 
program's strong points? 
2. What made the Avenger acquisition program a success? 
3. What lessons-learned, that can be applied to DOD acquisition programs in 
general, can be gained from the study of the SGT York and Avenger 
programs? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis covers only those aspects relating to the SGT York and Avenger 
acquisition programs as defined by the Author. Additionally, because this thesis focuses 
primarily on the program management and not on technical aspects, only a general 
description of the SGT York and Avenger and only as much technical specificity as 
necessary will be covered. Classified aspects of SGT York and Avenger will not be 
included. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEWS AND METHODOLOGY 
Background information was obtained from periodicals, reports, papers, DOD 
documents, and U.S. Army manuals. These materials were obtained from the Defense 
Technical Information Center, the Defense Logistics Systems Information Exchange, and 
the Naval Postgraduate School Library. For the SGT York, additional information was 
obtained from the Office of the Program Executive Officer for Field Artillery Systems, 
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey and the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort 
Bliss, Texas, and interviews with former SGT York personnel. The Forward Area Air 
Defense (FAAD) Project Office at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama was the primary source of 
information concerning the Avenger, as well as interviews with current and former 
Avenger program personnel. Other Avenger program information came from Boeing 
Aerospace, Missiles and Space Division of the Boeing Defense and Space Group, 
Huntsville, Alabama and the Directorate of Combat Developments, Fort Bliss, Texas. 
F. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS 
This thesis used concepts based upon DOD and Army definitions and acronyms 
used in acquisition management, SGT York and Avenger programs. Definitions of 
acquisition and program terms are provided throughout the thesis where needed, and 
Appendix A provides a consolidated list of acronyms. 
G. ORGANIZATION 
The organization of this thesis includes an introduction, four development chapters 
and a final chapter of conclusions and recommendations. Chapter II provides a brief 
review of the acquisition history of the SGT York and Avenger programs. Chapter III 
provides an analysis of the SGT York acquisition program. Chapter IV provides an 
analysis of the Avenger acquisition program. Chapter V describes the major lessons 
learned from the study of the SGT York and Avenger programs. Finally, Chapter VI 
presents conclusions and recommendations. 

II.  OVERVIEW 
A.     SGT YORK 
At the conclusion of the Vietnam War, public reaction to military spending was 
at an all time low. The Soviet Union was busy building up their military machine and 
producing an unprecedented number of close air support aircraft, and the quality of these 
systems were impressive. The Soviets also recognized the capabilities demonstrated by 
the U.S. attack helicopters in Vietnam and began to produce large quantities of these as 
well. 
As a result of this threat, the air defense community realized they needed a system 
to combat the Soviet air threat. The "Air Defense Evaluation Board Study, the Field 
Army Air Defense Study and the Short Range Air Defense Study" were conducted from 
1970 to 1975. These studies set the stage for the development of a powerful, lethal, radar 
directed, self-propelled gun like the SGT York. 
The major supporter for SGT York in the user community during this study period 
was Major General C.J. Levan, Commandant of the Air Defense Artillery School at Fort 
Bliss, Texas. He was heavily involved in conceptualizing the new system and was the 
champion of getting the concept of SGT York started. Additionally, Fort Bliss users were 
assisted by Army Material Command (AMC) in defining what was needed and what was 
possible in a new air defense gun system. 
In June 1975, the Army had synthesized its air defense needs enough to allow the 
signing of a formal Letter Of Agreement (LOA) between Fort Bliss users and Rock Island 
Arsenal outlining the general requirements for a new air defense gun system. Under this 
agreement the new system would be a gun, not a gun/missile mix as first envisioned, 
primarily because of a high cost factor. [Ref. 2:p. 101] The LOA resulted in the 
beginning of the new development program. 
The program was initially called the Army Gun Air Defense System (ARGADS). 
The first project manager was Colonel Russ Parker and Parker was in charge of a ten-man 
project management team whose first responsibility was to help the user finish the 
Required Operational Capability (ROC).   The initial ROC consisted of the following 
requirements: 
1. Must be a self propelled gun. 
2. Must be able to keep up with the combat maneuver elements of a heavy 
division. 
3. It must be able to shoot down fixed-wing aircraft at specified ranges, 
which were executing specified maneuvers at specified speeds. 
4. It must be able to shoot down helicopters at specified ranges and specified 
speeds.   [Ref. 2:p. 103] 
Because of the discontent in Congress and throughout the nation, with programs 
that took too long and cost too much, COL Parker's superior at AMC headquarters, 
Lieutenant General Sammet, suggested they move the program directly into full-scale 
engineering development. The key to this accelerated acquisition was the use of "off-the- 
shelf components. In January 1977, following this strategy, the first Army Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) addressed the issue of the chassis for the new 
system. The chassis selected under this decision was the M48A5 tank with a 750 
horsepower engine. Additionally, the gun selected was a proven European design and the 
radar was from the F-16 Fighter Plane.   [Ref. 2:p. 108] 
After the approval of ASARC I, COL Parker moved quickly to revise the ROC 
to provide the necessary flexibility. It stipulated only twelve firm design requirements, 
and 43 others that could be traded off.  The twelve firm design requirements were: 
1. Eight second response time from target appearance to shooting. 
2. 30 to 40 millimeter caliber cannon. 
3. Acquisition/tracking radar. 
4. Optical sensor. 
5. On board power. 
6. Ammunition family. 
7. Identification, friend or  foe (IFF) capability. 
8. Crew size. 
9. Environmental stresses. 
10. Install on Government furnished M48A5 chassis. 
11. Air transportable on C-5A. 
12. Radio communications. 
The 43 requirements which could be traded off in seeking optimum effectiveness 
included such elements as: 
1. Target acquisition on the move. 
2. Laser range finder. 
3. Electronic counter-counter measures. 
4. Built in test equipment. 
5. Environmental control unit (air conditioning).   [Ref. 3 :p. 11] 
Fort Bliss felt they had written a realistic requirements document which stretched 
gun computer technology to achievable limits and could handle the threat. 
The initial Request for Proposal (RFP) consisted of 1000 pages and was published 
in April 1977. It requested proposals by July 1977 for a system that would satisfy the 
revised ROC and stay within a Design-to-Unit- Production-Cost (DTUPC) of $1.5 million 
each (constant dollars). The RFP included a very detailed, itemized cost estimate which 
Government engineers and cost analysts had developed. This was the ceiling below which 
competing contractors were to structure their cost proposals.  [Ref. 2:p. 132] 
Five companies decided to respond to the RFP: Ford Aerospace, General 
Dynamics, General Electric, Raytheon, and Sperry. Each prepared a proposal to satisfy 
the requirements within the Government cost ceiling. The proposals were received in 
July 1977. AS ARC II was set for December 1977 and, according to instructions 
established from ASARC I, cost data on contractor proposals and the results from the Fort 
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Bliss Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) were presented. SGT York 
was given the go ahead to enter Full-Scale Engineering Development (FSED). Contracts 
with Ford Aerospace and General Dynamics (for $39 million each) to develop competitive 
prototypes within two years were signed in January 1978. Throughout the rest of 1978 
and 1979 the two contractor teams developed their designs. By the end of 1979 they were 
putting together hardware and implementing the computer software. [Ref. 2:pp. 142-147] 
The RFP for initial production was issued to Ford Aerospace and General 
Dynamics in April 1980, 27 months after the full scale engineering development contracts 
were issued. The RFP, which was 1250 pages plus an additional six amendments, stated 
in detail the requirements for fixing the shortcomings evidenced in the shoot-off (which 
wouldn't actually occur for another two months after this RFP was released), conducting 
a check test to insure all fixes were accomplished, completing the development of the 
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) package, preparing the tooling and production facilities 
and, finally, producing and delivering 263 vehicles.   [Ref. 4:p. 7] 
The shoot-off was conducted in the early summer 1980 and was broken down into 
two tests. The objective of the first test was to determine the accuracy of the gun 
systems. Crews fired approximately 250 engagements against fixed-wing aircraft and full 
and subscale helicopters. According to the test results, General Dynamic's gun out shot 
Ford's, destroying 19 targets compared to nine for Ford. In other tests, General Dynamics 
gun scored direct hits against subscale drones that were almost twice as far away as 
Ford's target hits. The second test was a field problem designed to test the systems 
reliability, maintainability, and durability, which was barely won by Ford. [Ref. 5:p. 30] 
Evaluation of the proposals was conducted in late 1980 based on the selection 
criteria of cost, system performance, tactical suitability, supportability, interoperability and 
producability. Quality of management was also a criterion. Contract negotiations were 
held with Ford and General Dynamics from January through May 1981. The General 
Dynamics' total contract package cost 8% more than Ford's. This was the deciding factor 
between Ford and General Dynamics. Ford Aerospace was awarded the contract on 5 
May 1981.   [Ref. 5:p. 34] 
The Army contract with Ford Aerospace was a Fixed-Price-Incentive, Firm Target 
(FPIF) type of contract. The contract was divided into four major segments, a basic 
segment and three options. The Basic segment allocated the first contract year to 
designing and developing the Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) package, correcting the 
41 problems identified in the shoot-off, as well as cleaning up the design in general. 
Option 1 was the option to buy 50 SGT YORK launch systems with associated 
engineering services support equipment, production facilities and literature for $328 
million total target price. Option 2 was for buying an additional 96 vehicles with 
associated management, engineering, ammunition and testing services for a total target 
price of $396 million. Option 3 was in the contract for 130 vehicles and associated 
service and items for a total target price of $533 million. [Ref. 6:p. 3] Page 10, Figure 
1 shows a rear view of SGT York. 
The next four years SGT York ran into steadily increasing opposition. The 
production phase was an uphill battle primarily because of the accelerated acquisition 
strategy which removed five years from the normal development process. Consequently, 
the hardware and software had more than its share of problems that needed to be fixed. 
Additionally, because of these technical problems, operational test results were poor. The 
changing threat, and to no small degree the media attention from SGT York's poor 
testing, also contributed to Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger canceling SGT York 
on 27 August 1985.  In a press release he stated: 
Based on demonstrated operational tests the system's performance does not 
meet the military threat. The test also demonstrated that any marginal 
improvements that could be made to SGT York are not significant 
compared to the capability of current Air Defense systems and, therefore, 
not worth the cost.   [Ref. 2:p. 178] 
The final totals for SGT York was $1.8 billion spent and 65 SGT Yorks produced. 
Of the $1.8 billion, $300-500 million was salvaged for use on other systems. The rest 
was lost. 





Figure 1.   Rear View of M247 SGT York 
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B.     AVENGER 
The Avenger began in the early part of the 1980's by Boeing Aerospace Company, 
and was based on the potential possibility that the Army would need an air defense 
weapon system. At the time, Boeing was under contract to build the Roland Air Defense 
System for the U.S. Army. Engineers at Boeing attempted to fire Stinger missiles off the 
Roland launchers utilizing their radar tracking capabilities. This experimental system 
proved to be quite effective. Because of this success, Boeing realized the potential of 
integrating Stinger launchers on to the newly developed High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) to create a new air defense system. 
By May 1984, the first prototype was ready for testing. Boeing began testing with 
the 9th Infantry Division (motorized) Air Defense Artillery (DIVADA) which used 
HMMWVs with shoulder launched stingers. Test firing was conducted at Yakima 
Washington firing center. Three shots were fired from both moving and fixed positions 
utilizing the HMMWV. All targets were killed in this test, which demonstrated the 
capabilities of this potential weapon system.   [Ref. 7] 
Similarly, the U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) was developing its own 
version of a pedestal-mounted stinger (PMS) known as Setter, with the help of General 
Dynamics. In 1985, the Army tested both the Setter and Avenger at Yakima Firing 
Center. Both systems proved to be very successful and warranted an NDI Acquisition 
Strategy. [Ref. 8] Based on these test results from Yakima, General Max Thurman, the 
Army Vice Chief of Staff, directed the Army to purchase a pedestal mounted system. 
Another event which occurred during this period was the cancellation of SGT York 
in August 1985. Since SGT York was designed to be the air defense gun of the future, 
its cancellation left a tremendous gap in the Army's air defense capabilities. Because of 
this weakness, the Army needed to quickly reexamine the direction air defense needed to 
proceed. They formed the Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) working group to develop 
a well thought out and "totally integrated counter air approach to the forward area air 
defense problem."   [Ref. 9:p. 12] 
The FAAD working group concluded in January 1986 with the following recom- 
mendations: They concluded that the Soviet Aerial Weapon Systems, both fixed-wing and 
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rotary, were expanding as well as improving technologically. They decided that one 
system for air defense could not effectively handle all of the potential air threats and they 
concluded that a family of weapon systems would be needed to handle the threat. This 
system would later be known as the Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS). 
The concept of the FAAD system was to integrate five components that would all 
work together to defeat the Soviet threat. These components included: Command, 
Control and Intelligence (C2I); Line-of-Sight Rear (LOS-R); Non-line- of- Sight (NLOS); 
Line- of- Sight Forward (LOS-F); and the Combined Arms Initiative (CAI). [Ref. 10] 
PMS would be the Line-of-Sight Rear (LOS-R) component of the FAADS System. 
The FAAD working group had some issues to resolve. By the mid 1980's, costs 
on military acquisitions had become a major issue with Congress. Additionally, the threat 
from the Soviet Union was very real and required the air defense system to be fielded as 
rapidly as possible. Fortunately, NDIs were available to meet most of the FAAD 
requirements. NDIs were becoming more popular in Congress because they were 
supposed to be cheaper and faster to field. With this in mind, senior Army officials 
ordered an NDI approach wherever possible in the FAAD System development. [Ref. 
9:p. 14]   Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger approved the FAADS concepts in 
January 1986. 
With the FAAD System approved, the acquisition process began. In March 1986, 
the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved the Required Operational Capability 
(ROC) document. The LOS-R component, which had already been successfully tested at 
Yakima, would be an NDI PMS, and DOD moved it up to a Milestone IIIA review 
decision with a Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP). The Army began planning for an 
NDI Candidate Evaluation (NDICE) for PMS.   [Ref. 10] 
In July 1986, the Request For Proposal (RFP) was issued. Three companies, 
Boeing Aerospace with Avenger, General Dynamics/Thomson-CSF/Hughes Electro- 
Optical Data Systems Group with an unnamed prototype, and LTV Aerospace with 
Crossbow (Setter), submitted proposals. They were each given 100,000 dollars to develop 
a prototype PMS for NDICE testing.   [Ref. 11] 
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Testing began in November 1986 at Fort Bliss, Texas and White Sands Missile 
Range in New Mexico. The General Dynamics' candidate was eliminated before actual 
firing because it failed to meet the weight evaluation criteria. Testing continued with 
Avenger and Crossbow until July 1987. Based on the NDICE test results, Avenger was 
the clear winner. On this basis, Boeing's Avenger was selected to fulfill the requirements 
of the PMS and the LOS-R component of the FAAD System. This was a 16.2 million 
dollar initial option buy of 20 Avengers. The contract also contained production options 
for FY 1987 through FY 1991 for a total of 273 Avengers. [Ref. 12:p. 1] Page 13, 
Figure 2 shows a picture of Boeing's Avenger System. 
The Avenger was type-classified in 1987 as Limited Procurement Urgent, which 
put a higher priority upon Avenger's procurement in an effort to speed the acquisition 
process. [Ref. 10] Within fourteen months after the contract was awarded to Boeing, the 
first Avengers were fielded. 
The Army continued to run tests on the Avenger prototype used for NDICE. The 
Army began the first phase of Force Development Test and Experimentation (FDT&E). 
This was the Army's initial effort to evaluate doctrine and tactics for Avenger. These 
tests were conducted in June and July 1988 at Fort Bliss, Texas. Six new Avengers were 
used for the second phase of FDT&E at Fort Hunter Liggett, California in March 1989. 
Additionally, Avenger passed the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) and the 
Production Qualification Test (PQT), which cleared the way for Avenger to be Type- 
Classified Standard (TC-S), which cleared the way for Avenger's full-scale production 
Milestone IIIB review. The review was conducted in April 1990, at which time the DAB 
approved full-scale production of Avenger. Avenger met Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC) in January 1991. Additionally, Avenger was employed quite effectively during 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  [Ref. 10] 
The original contract with Boeing expired in 1991 and the Army awarded a $436.2 
million, five-year multiyear contract to Boeing in February 1992 for the production of an 
additional 679 Avengers. Most recently, the Avenger was fielded to the 2-2 ADA (35th 
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Figure 2.  Avenger System 
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ADA BDE).   In January 1995, fielding will begin at the 82nd Airborne Division.   The 
program office continues to make P3I Block upgrades to improve Avenger.   [Ref. 11] 
15 
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III.      DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE SGT YORK 
ACQUISITION PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Cancellation of a program is an emotional event for any Program Manager, as well 
as to the Service that sponsors the program. The SGT York was no different. Although 
all programs face many hurdles, the SGT York was doomed from the start, primarily 
because of the acquisition strategy and other factors that were detrimental to the program. 
The SGT York was to be acquired under an accelerated strategy, the objective 
being to field the weapon system as quickly as possible with substantial cost savings. 
This accelerated acquisition strategy included the use of proven, reliable major 
components (M48A5 tank chassis and M-60 tank power train) and the incorporation of 
European designed gun hardware (40mm gun) and mature hardware derivatives (F-16 
radar system). Additionally, the Army adopted a "Skunk Works" approach that allows 
the contractor to use in-house initiatives and resources during engineering development 
to further refine the technical characteristics of the weapon system. This strategy also 
emphasized minimum Government management during system development, restricted 
access to contractors and contractor information to avoid leaking proprietary or 
competition-sensitive information, and reduced the likelihood of a protest from the 
contractor not selected for production. 
The SGT York's acquisition strategy was to have three phases: (1) engineering 
development, which included a 29-month competition between two contractors selected 
from an original group of five, (2) follow-on development and initial production by the 
winning contractor, and (3) follow-on production. The acquisition strategy was designed 
to field a system in about six and a half years, from program initiation in February 1977 
to achieving initial operational capability in October 1983.   [Ref. 13:p. 40] 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE SGT YORK ACQUISITION PROGRAM 
The acquisition strategy of the SGT York was unique because it combined several 
concepts to attempt to accelerate fielding. These concepts were competitive development; 
a "skunk works" approach to program management in which contractors were allowed to 
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design the system the way they thought most appropriate in order to meet the Army's 
requirements (this in essence turned out to be a "hands off approach where Government 
played a minimal role in the management of the development of the weapon system) a 
curt, combined development and operational test prior to production; and a phase which 
combined the system's follow-on development, referred to as the maturity phase, and 
initial production. It was hoped that these concepts would significantly shorten the 
development phases preceding the initial production. Since it was recognized that such 
an acquisition strategy was inherently risky, several safeguards were used that the Army 
believed would minimize these risks. Most important were the use of proven sub- 
components, the negotiation of a fixed-price development contract with fixed-price 
production options, and a warranty designed to protect the Government against cost 
increases resulting from corrections of design and various other problems. 
The first phase of the acquisition strategy consisted of the development 
competition between the two designated contractors. This resulted in the Army receiving 
two complete prototypes to be used in a head-to-head evaluation. The advantages of this 
concept is that the Army had actual hardware with which to make a comparison, and it 
stimulated the contractors' creativity to devise a system to meet the mission. 
Many of these advantages may have been lost, however, because the Army decided 
to select the prime contractor for full-scale production following the development and 
operational tests. The results of the tests showed that both the Ford Aerospace prototype, 
which was selected, and the General Dynamics corporation prototype displayed significant 
shortcomings and still required further development. [Ref. 6:p. 6] It may have been 
more prudent to have waited until the systems were more fully developed before making 
the selection. 
The "hands-off, skunk works" approach minimized the amount of Government 
intervention by "holding quarterly 2-day design review meetings at each contractor's 
location and to reviewing contractor-generated reports." [Ref. 14:p. 40] This concept led 
to the thinly staffed Government and contract program staffs being shielded from 
interference by other curious Government agencies. Additionally, it gave the contractors 
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significant freedom and responsibility to create a weapon system to meet the Army's 
needs.  The key points of a skunk works project were: 
1. Strong authority to the team leader. 
2. Strong but small project office. 
3. Restrict the number of people connected with the program (10-25% of 
normal). 
4. Simple and flexible control of drawings. 
5. Minimum reporting, but thorough recording of important work. 
6. Monthly cost reviews including predicted costs to complete. 
7. Prime contractor has strong authority to pick and deal with vendors. 
8. Nonduplicative inspections. 
9. Contractor has authority to test his product. 
10. Agreement on specifications before contract is signed. 
11. Timely funding from customers. 
12. Mutual trust between Government and the contractor. 
13. Strongly controlled, limited access by outsiders. 
14. Good pay not based on the number of people supervised [Ref. 15:p. 18] 
Lockheed had used this concept quite successfully on their aircraft contracts. All 
potential prime contractors for SGT York were briefed by Lockheed on how "skunk 
works" should be implemented. There is some speculation that the army's contractors did 
not fully understand or incorporate the "skunk works" concept. [Ref. 16:p. 11] A failure 
to fully implement this concept could have created additional problems for SGT York's 
acquisition. 
Another significant point was that the contractor was given the authority to trade- 
off some of the requirements in order to gain an overall cost savings at the expense of 
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performance. The Army established 12 firm requirements that each competing 
contractor's weapon system had to meet. Beyond these, the Army identified 43 system 
requirements in priority order which each contractor could trade-off to help lower the 
program's cost. For example, Ford Aerospace elected not to equip its weapon with night 
vision capability, one of the 43 tradeable items, in an effort to keep unit production costs 
down.   [Ref. 6:p. 16] 
In the interest of accelerating the SGT York's fielding, the Army decided to 
perform developmental activities concurrently with production and to conduct less testing 
before the production decision than is usually conducted under a more conventional 
acquisition strategy. With this strategy, the competitive "shoot-off was the only 
scheduled test before the Army made its selection and awarded the source the phase II 
contract. Phase II itself involved "initiating production before completing the 
development of the weapon system". [Ref. 4:p. 5] The "check test" was planned to be 
conducted at the end of the maturity phase to discover whether the prime contractor had 
resolved problems found in its weapon system during the competition. The next test was 
scheduled to use initial production units and was not slated until the end of phase II. 
Because of the desire to accelerate the program, many development tests were 
deferred until after production began. These tests included "operation in a cold climate, 
durability of the system in stressful battlefield conditions, system transportability, and 
electromagnetic compatibility and interference."   [Ref. 16:p. 6] 
Operational tests, which were scheduled to be held before the production decision 
was made, were "constrained by limited realism of the test environment, which to some 
extent was unavoidable because of safety considerations." Operational issues which were 
not planned to be fully evaluated prior to production included: operation and maintenance 
by Army personnel; proposed doctrine, tactics and training; and system effectiveness and 
survivability as part of a larger force in combat.   [Ref. 16:p. 7] 
Additionally, "the development of integrated logistics support requirements and 
resources was deferred until after the winning contractor was selected so that costs would 
not be incurred to support more than one system." [Ref. 17:TabQ] The development of 
the support package is important for operational testing because a key part of this testing 
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is the Army's ability to train soldiers to operate and maintain the weapon under battlefield 
conditions. 
The accelerated acquisition program of the SGT York also involved risks, 
particularly in view of the planned concurrence and limited testing. In order to minimize 
these risks, several safeguards were built in the system's acquisition strategy. The first 
was the use of proven sub-components; the second was obtaining more extensive warranty 
coverage than generally found in major weapon systems contracts; and the third was 
negotiating fixed-price development and production contracts. 
The basic rule used during phase I competition was that each contractor was to use 
proven subsystems instead of an all-new design. The assumption was that this would 
reduce design problems and allow for an accelerated development schedule. The only 
development task then would be to integrate these proven subsystems into one weapon 
system. Each contractor was to use the M48A5 tank chassis as the vehicle for its weapon 
system and each chose a mature radar and gun system to include in its design. 
Another safeguard of this strategy was that of the extensive warranty. Once Ford 
Aerospace accepted the position as the prime contractor for the system, they also accepted 
the responsibility of the warranty associated with the program. These terms stated that 
Ford would be held responsible for ensuring that the system met all specifications, which 
were derived from the Air Defense gun requirements, in the maturity phase. In essence, 
all corrections to the system required for it to meet specifications, and any problems in 
the system caused by defective workmanship or material, would be corrected at no charge 
to the Government. "In the Army's view, this warranty was a safeguard against any cost 
increases that might arise from needing to correct performance deficiencies."   [Ref. 18] 
This warranty was a new concept, according to the Army, because of its ground 
breaking nature. Prior to warranty legislation included as section 794 of the fiscal year 
1984 Department of Defense Appropriation Act, the standard warranty clause traditionally 
covered only workmanship defects. This warranty protected the Army against claims 
arising from design defects, which are typically the significant problem for the 
Government. This type of coverage is basically the provisions detailed in the section 794 
legislation. 
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The last safeguard which the Army employed to minimize risk associated with the 
accelerated acquisition program was that of fixed price contracts. Initially, during phase 
I, the Army awarded fixed-price contracts to the competing contractors. The idea was 
that these fixed-price contracts would complement the "hands-off and tradable 
requirements concepts, eliciting the contractors' best efforts as well as offering a cost 
savings for the Government. The three production options included in phase II were also 
fixed-priced, however, they were also with incentives. The intent behind this was to 
provide protection against cost growth during production when only one contractor would 
be producing the weapon. Thus, the production prices had the benefit of being established 
through competition. The Army also held the possibility of reopening competition for 
phase HI production as additional cost protection.   [Ref. 4:p. 14] 
In looking at the acquisition strategy, there are many items that were innovative 
and offered a number of theoretical advantages, lending credence to the idea that an 
accelerated strategy should have been undertaken in the procurement of the SGT York. 
However, in practice many of these concepts employed in the strategy were never fully 
realized, or actually contributed to the demise of the program. 
Although the contractual aspect of the strategy did hold down program costs, this 
advantage was outweighed by other elements of the strategy which contributed to the 
program's cancellation. These elements were the "hands-off approach taken by the Army 
during the development phase, limiting the reviews of the contractors progress and 
inhibiting wider dissemination of information about the program, and the reduced testing 
required by the strategy.  Each of these elements will now be looked at in more detail. 
Basically, there were three factors that contributed to the effectiveness of the 
control of costs during the program. The first was the use of "fixed-price production 
options covering nearly half the planned quantities. The second was the use of proven 
components to reduce the technical development costs. The third was the use of 
integrated prototypes during competition." [Ref. 18] Even with the use of the proven 
components and the integrated prototypes, the program still had difficulties integrating the 
components and continued to have major performance problems that could have lead to 
increased costs.   The use of fixed-priced contracts resulted in the only effective cost 
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control measure of the strategy when the program was terminated. The other feature 
where the Government expected to gain cost savings was in the warranty package, which 
ensured all costs to correct design deficiencies would be borne by the contractor. 
To the point at which it was cancelled, the program was controlling costs. 
However, history has shown that at the point where the Government has to negotiate 
contracts based on actual production experience, many major weapon systems have 
incurred significant cost growth. Since the Army never reached this point in the SGT 
York program life cycle, it is difficult to determine whether the cost savings associated 
with this strategy would have continued. 
Although fixed-price options can be credited with holding down the costs of the 
first 146 gun systems, they caused a problem in that officials were too sensitive to the fact 
that they were fixed-priced and allowed this to weigh heavily in decisions of whether to 
proceed with production on schedule, even though the system displayed "serious technical 
difficulties and critical performance capabilities were not demonstrated." [Ref. 19] The 
Army maintained, however, that "deferring production would cause a lost opportunity to 
take advantage of favorable procurement options." [Ref. 18] 
The ultimate goal of the accelerated acquisition strategy used in the SGT York 
acquisition program was to obtain an early IOC date. However, this never happened. 
The gains in time that the Army expected from combining development and initial 
production were never realized. Starting with the immaturity of the prototypes delivered 
for the 1980 competitive tests, the program began to slip. Tests were delayed while 
others had to be added, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense became involved in 
reviewing the program and in evaluating the SGT York's performance in the tests. [Ref. 
11] 
According to projections, had the SGT York program continued, actual IOC would 
have been about three and a half years later than was called for in the original schedule. 
Instead of an IOC of six and a half years after program initiation, the projections showed 
that it would have taken about ten years to accomplish.   Reasons for this delay can be 
attributed to three areas:  "(1) the deletion of fiscal year 1981 production due to funding 
cuts which delayed the first year's production by about one and a half years, (2) 
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production start-up problems, which delayed deliveries, and (3) deferral of the third 
production option decision to conduct additional operational testing, which led to 
stretching out delivery of units already under contract to avoid a production line 
shutdown." [Ref. 18] The last two areas which delayed the program are directly related 
to the underestimation of the need for testing, and the insufficient information available 
for decision makers due to the "hands-off' management approach used by the Army. 
The SGT York test units were less technically mature than anticipated. This gave 
rise to testing delays and the need for additional testing. The integration of the weapon's 
major subcomponents, as well as the modifications necessary to allow these subsystems 
to function on the weapon system, represented greater technical challenges than 
anticipated. An example of this integration problem was the F-16 radar provided by 
Westinghouse. Westinghouse had numerous problems integrating the radar for ground use 
and had to modify it so that it would function properly on SGT York. [Ref. 20] Since 
evaluations of the SGT York's tests were not seen as favorably by the Secretary of 
Defense as by the Army, changes in the program's course had to be made. Also, under 
pressure to show that the weapon system was capable of accomplishing the required 
specifications before it could obtain approval to proceed with the third year's 
procurement, the Army added some tests and moved others. 
As stated earlier, the initial competitive testing of the two contractors was difficult 
due to the immaturity of the systems. Although these tests were scheduled for 30 days, 
they had to be canceled because of system failures. This caused a two month delay until 
the tests could be completed. After source selection in 1980, Ford Aerospace was to 
conduct a "check test" to ensure that it had corrected all of the deficiencies noted during 
the competitive testing. The test, however, revealed that not all the noted system 
problems had been corrected. [Ref. 18] Even so, the Army and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense supported exercising the first production option. 
The durability and maintainability test which had become a seven month test, was 
scheduled to begin in February 1982. The Army delayed start until May 1982 to give the 
contractor time to upgrade its prototype.   Still, after three attempts to demonstrate the 
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prototype's readiness for production, the Army's test and evaluation agencies concluded 
the prototype was unsuitable for testing and discontinued the test. 
In addition to two tests being added to the program, a series of events in early 
1984 stretched the program even more, which caused Ford Aerospace to deliver its first 
SGT York in March 1984. This was five months later than called for in the contract. 
Ford had encountered problems in making the transition from prototypes to production 
units, including test failures, design changes rework, and assembly difficulties. [Ref. 18] 
It was at this point that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering directed the Army not to exercise the third production option until solid test 
results were available. The Army conducted this testing in July 1984, referred to as the 
"limited test." [Ref. 6:p. 26] The test results were inconclusive due to the lack of realism 
of the test and the statistically insignificant number of SGT Yorks. The Secretary of 
Defense decided to defer exercising option III until after further operational tests. These 
tests were conducted in June 1985. 
The limited testing contributed to a lack of prompt recognition that system flaws 
were not being corrected as needed to justify continued production. Additionally, it 
combined with the "hands-off' management style of the Army to make it even more 
difficult to justify funding for the program, and as a result contributed to program delays. 
The constraints resulting from the "hands-off management style inhibited essential 
information on system performance and program progress from reaching those who were 
to make funding and programming decisions. Earlier, this same lack of data contributed 
to significant reductions in the Army's 1981 planned budget, resulting in major program 
restructuring. 
The deletion of the 1985 purchase of SGT York and the deferral on exercising 
further production options were due to the system's performance in testing and to the 
uncertainty about the system stemming from the lack of sufficient operational testing on 
production units. Thus, although the acquisition strategy called for little operational 
testing to be done before initial production, such testing proved to be necessary to 
continuing the program. 
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In the end, once all of the testing had been concluded and the evaluations of the 
test data had been completed, the Army's position was that the SGT York's performance 
"was found to be significantly better than the Vulcan's, although some system 
shortcomings still required correcting." [Ref. 18] Evaluators from the Office of 
Operational Test and Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, however, 
reviewing the same data, found that "although the SGT York represented an improvement 
over the current Vulcan air defense gun, it did not adequately protect friendly forces 
during simulated combat." Also, the system was found "not operationally suitable because 
of its low availability stemming from its being frequently down for maintenance."  [Ref. 
6:p. 27] 
According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense officials, the SGT York could 
not effectively meet the Soviet helicopter threat. Overall, in simulated Force - on - Force 
engagements, the system brought down an unacceptably small number of helicopters and 
the forces it was protecting suffered large losses. 
1.        Negative Press 
As in most Government projects, negative press was a problem. In SGT York's 
case, it was one of the primary factors in its failure. This was primarily attributable to 
the "hands off approach the Army used with the press and Congress. Since the press 
never likes to be left out, they found their own methods to get information on SGT York. 
For some reason, what information that was leaked was usually bad. Informed sources 
within the program and OSD who were opposed to SGT York found ways to leak 
negative information to the press. Additionally, poor performances on operational tests 
created more bad press and fueled the fire within the Pentagon and Congress to cancel 
SGT York. Congressman Denny Smith, Co-Chairman of the Military Reform Caucus, 
was a key figure in the negative press that surrounded the program. Congressman Smith 
was able to get "leaked information" from unknown sources and give this information to 
the Washington Post. He and the Washington Post were quite effective in damaging the 
SGT York program.   [Ref. 21:pp. 20-24] 
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2. Lack of Sponsorship 
With these inherent shortcomings in the SGT York program, sponsorship was 
needed to help keep the program viable. Unfortunately for SGT York, they had no 
military or political support. In the eight years the program ran, numerous changes took 
place, both in the Pentagon and within the White House administration. It was a 
monumental task keeping a program like SGT York going. One major reason for this 
lack of a sponsor was the "hands off acquisition strategy. It closed out the Army staff, 
OSD, the user, and almost everyone who normally participates in the early development. 
It is in this period where a program gains support, but in SGT York's case any supporters 
were alienated. Even Congress was not briefed on the progress of the SGT York system. 
The positive attributes and the progress of SGT York were poorly marketed to the people 
who could have supported the program. With a stronger sponsorship, many 
misinterpretations by Congress, the Pentagon, and the press could have been dealt with 
more effectively.   [Ref. 16:pp. 5-6] 
Along the same lines, Ford Aerospace and Communication Company, who was 
awarded the phase II contract, was unwilling to fight for the SGT York program at the 
top levels of OSD. There are three theories on why Ford did not support SGT York. 
The first is the "hands off approach the Army used. Ford may have decided that since 
the Army did not feel the need to support or defend SGT York, they would follow the 
same strategy and resist the temptation to lobby Congress. The second possibility relates 
to the Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm Target Contract (FPIF). As Bob Seamonds pointed out, 
when Ford Aerospace assessed the long term profits and losses from the program they 
became painfully aware of the true cost of producing an acceptable SGT York. Ford's 
highest decision makers lost interest in the project and were not willing to support the 
program. Lastly, because of the growing negative press about SGT York, Ford did not 
want the bad press to reflect on their primary mission of building automobiles. Ford may 
have tried to distance themselves from SGT York. [Ref. 20] Any one of these reasons 
could have hurt the program's chances for success. 
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IV.    DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE AVENGER ACQUISITION 
PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As described earlier, the Acquisition program, as defined in this thesis, includes 
the acquisition strategy and any other significant factors that affected the acquisition of 
the Avenger. This chapter includes additional analysis of the Avenger acquisition strategy 
and those additional factors that influenced Avenger's procurement. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE AVENGER ACQUISITION PROGRAM 
One of the keys to the success of any program is the acquisition strategy. In 
looking at Avenger's acquisition program's success, a quick review of its acquisition 
strategy would be useful. The Avenger program's acquisition strategy was developed in 
September 1986 and updated in May 1988. There are twelve major elements that were 
critical to the overall management of the program. Each element is briefly described 
below: 
1. The program called for a prime contractor with total system integration 
utilizing an NDI procurement. 
2. A tailored acquisition process based on a low risk NDI procurement. 
Program management officials were permitted to tailor the acquisition 
process so that Avenger could move directly into the Production and 
Deployment (P/D) phase. This was based on responses from RFPs and a 
good market investigation. 
3. Manpower Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) analysis was to be 
conducted throughout all Avenger testing from NDICE through Production 
Qualification Test (PQT). 
4. Initial logistics support for Avenger was provided by the prime contractor 
though an Interim Contractor support agreement for at least the first 29 
months of fielding. Additionally, maximum use of built in test equipment; 
line replaceable units; standard support; and test equipment were also 
planned for in the acquisition strategy. 
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5. Manufacturing and production directed that the contractor have total system 
integration responsibility.  Total production of Avenger through FY 1999 
UIM nlonnpH at 1907 wstems was pla ed at 2  syst s 
6. Test and evaluation was designed to be tailored to support a low risk NDI 
acquisition strategy. Four types of tests were to be conducted on Avenger. 
These were NDI candidate evaluation (NDICE), Force Development Test 
and Experimentation (FDT&E), Production Qualification Test (PQT), and 
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). 
7. Cost growth was to be controlled by only one method since Avenger was 
considered low risk. The cost goal used in the Avenger program was the 
Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC). The PAUC included procurement 
costs and RDT&E costs. Design-to-cost would not be used because the 
system was available for immediate production. 
8. Technical risk was assessed as being low because Avenger was an NDI and 
because of previous tests and evaluations. 
9. Human Factor Engineering (HFE) was to be conducted throughout the 
testing of the system to identify any issues affecting soldier and system 
effectiveness. 
10. Standardization of the Avenger hardware was not considered important 
since Avenger was a NDI. Interoperability was considered enhanced 
because of the Stinger missile. 
11. Avenger had to meet three survivability criteria. First, its ballistic 
protection had to be equal to or greater than a HMMWV. Second, it had 
to meet standards set forth in AR70-71 for Nuclear Biological and 
Chemical (NBC) survivability. Third, it directed that Avenger must be 
decontaminated using materials that resist contaminate absorption. [Ref. 
22:pp. 33-42] 
12. The contracting strategy consisted of the following key elements: 
a. Broad-based with full and open competition. 
b. Multiyear follow-on acquisitions. 
c. Dual-source procurement of the SVML. 
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d. Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production (SAIP). 
e. Competition by the prime contractor in subcontracting [Ref. 23 :pp. 
1-2]. 
Additionally, Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contracts were to be used to the maximum 
extent because Avenger was a low risk NDI acquisition. The initial contract was FFP 
with the following options: 
1. Delivery of the first system 14 months after contract award. 
2. Provisions for Interim Contractor Support (ICS) and SAIP until Army 
could implement its logistics support structure. 
3. Planned Annual procurement quantities for four additional years. 
4. Delivery of a Technical Data Package (TDP) with rights delineated in a 
license agreement.   [Ref. 10] 
There are numerous success factors within the Avenger program. Avenger had an 
extremely high approval rating and a great deal of support from the user community and 
Congress. The Avenger program was perceived by Congress as being well-managed with 
an effective program manager and staff. [Ref. 22:p. 48] Avenger implemented an 
effective NDI acquisition strategy that remained on time and on schedule. The user 
community was a huge supporter of Avenger. Generals Donald Infante, Chief of Air 
Defense Artillery (ADA) from 1985-1989 and Donald Lionette, Chief of ADA from 1989- 
1991 were extremely supportive sponsors of Avenger [Ref. 11]. Both spoke highly of 
Avenger throughout the user community and Congress. Additionally, the program office 
put in extra time and effort to keep Congress and the press informed on Avenger's 
progress, especially the successes of the program. This effort was quite effective since 
there was never any negative press associated with Avenger and Congress considers 
Avenger a real success story.  [Ref. 10] 
The Avenger program conducted a very successful market investigation to 
determine if a PMS system was a viable concept. From this, it was determined that an 
NDI strategy was appropriate. The market investigation was critical to the success of the 
Avenger acquisition strategy [Ref. 10]. 
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Program Management Officials realized that logistics support would lag behind the 
deployment of Avengers primarily because of the rapid 29 month fielding. In an attempt 
to close this gap, the program management team utilized Interim Contractor Support (ICS) 
during the first 29 months to insure there was basic logistics support when Avenger was 
fielded. [Ref. 22:pp. 50-51] This proved to be an effective method of controlling the 
logistics problem. 
The use of Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) Contracts proved to be another success factor 
for Avenger. Because the Avenger was an NDI acquisition with little research and 
development required, the program was considered to be low risk. Since Avenger was 
a low risk NDI, the program management officials felt that an FFP contract would be 
appropriate. This helped reduce administrative and management costs and reduced 
contractual risk to the Government. Also, since the program was quite stable, a multiyear 
procurement was considered appropriate. The Government could take advantage of lower 
Economic Order Quality (EOQ) prices offered by the contractor.   [Ref. 22:p. 51] 
Another important factor that made the Avenger program a success was the 
effective tailoring of the acquisition process, which is key to an effective NDI acquisition 
strategy. The program management officials were given tremendous leeway to tailor the 
Avenger acquisition process because Avenger was going to be a low technical risk NDI 
acquisition. This tailoring allowed for a reduction in the administrative and procedural 
requirements. [Ref. 10] This reduced the cost and the time of the entire Avenger 
program. 
Another key factor was the tailored test and evaluation (T&E) program. Because 
the Avenger was an NDI acquisition the Army modified the test plan. This tailoring 
allowed the test and evaluation to be reduced by combining developmental testing and 
operational testing without a loss of efficiency. This allowed Avenger to be fielded much 
quicker and at additional program cost savings.  [Ref. 22:p. 52] 
Another key success factor was the concurrent design of Pre-Planned Product 
Improvement (P3Is) during the P/D phase of the acquisition process. Because of the 
urgent need for Avenger by the Army, it was fielded with only two changes.  All other 
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improvements were made later according to the Avenger System Improvement Plan (SIP). 
This plan allowed for quicker fielding of Avenger.   [Ref. 22:p. 52] 
One last factor that helped the Avenger Program succeed was the dedication and 
experience of the prime contractor, Boeing Aerospace. Boeing had experience with many 
air defense systems and had consistently produced these systems on time and on cost. 
[Ref. 22:p. 52] Additionally, Boeing did its part to lobby Congress to support Avenger. 




V.       LESSONS-LEARNED FROM THE SGT YORK AND 
AVENGER ACQUISITION PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of the SGT York and Avenger acquisition programs reveals many 
acquisition management lessons-learned. These lessons-learned are qualitative in nature 
and are based upon SGT York's and Avenger's acquisition strategies and those critical 
factors that most effected those programs. The lessons-learned in this chapter are not all 
inclusive. They are the significant ones identified from the analysis identified in this 
thesis. 
Additionally, these lessons-learned are not designed to make any conclusions on 
the competency of the program management of SGT York or Avenger. They are intended 
to help acquisition managers and their staffs to effectively manage future acquisition 
programs.  This will also help students studying acquisition management. 
B. LESSONS-LEARNED 
The significant lessons-learned from the examination of the SGT York and 
Avenger acquisition programs include the following: 
NDI Acquisition Strategies work well if they are used to produce a 
mature system. This strategy worked well for Avenger because all of the 
components of Avenger had been tested and proven reliable prior to the 
Government buying Avengers. Avenger was produced on time and on 
cost, whereas SGT York was much more complex with many uncertainties 
within its software and hardware development that had not been worked 
out prior to the Government buying SGT York. Additionally, SGT York 
required enormous integration of hardware and software to produce a 
functional system. This required numerous modifications which took time 
and money to accomplish and the reliability of SGT York never reached 
its required level. 
The continuing support of Congress, DOD, and the user community 
is critical to the success of any acquisition program. SGT York had no 
military or political support. The primary reason for this was the "skunk 
works" acquisition strategy which closed out the Army staff, OSD, the user 
and Congress from the program. This secrecy negated any possible 
support, especially when that support was needed to keep the program 
alive. Avenger, however, was much more successful because it developed 
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a strong link between the program office, the user and Congress by 
keeping them informed of the program's progress. 
Portrayal in the media is important. Because of the "skunk works" 
strategy, the press printed whatever information they could gather. This 
was normally information about poor test results that may or may not have 
been true. The SGT York program office did little to refute these articles 
because of "skunk works." Because of this negative press, many 
Americans, including politicians, were persuaded that SGT York was a bad 
idea and helped lead to SGT York's demise. Avenger's program office 
worked hard to keep the press correctly informed of Avenger's status so 
that what information was printed was correct. The press had a much 
more positive view of Avenger's abilities. 
Proper tailoring of the Acquisition strategy is critical in an NDI 
Acquisition. Because of the complexity of SGT York and the fact that it 
had many unproven components, more developmental testing and opera- 
tional testing was needed. A full-length acquisition program would have 
given SGT York a better chance of success by giving it the necessary test 
time so problems could be isolated and fixed. Avenger was much less 
complex with proven components. The decision to move directly into the 
production phase was correct considering the level of development 
Avenger displayed. Avenger did not require numerous modifications to 
move into production and development. 
It is critical that program managers fully understand how to properly 
tailor an NDI Acquisition. Avenger's program management team did an 
outstanding job of determining the level of development needed in the 
program so they could properly tailor out unnecessary test requirements 
without compromising the quality of the system. SGT York's Program 
Management team miscalculated the amount of developmental and 
operational testing required to field a reliable system. SGT York moved 
too quickly into the production phase. Future program managers need 
training in NDI acquisition so they can always ascertain how much 
tailoring is appropriate for a program. 
A thorough market investigation is critical when using an NDI 
Acquisition strategy. The program office did an outstanding job of 
investigating the technical feasibility of developing Avenger before 
investing Government money. They also looked into the competency of 
potential prime contractors to accomplish the mission. SGT York's 
program office failed to conduct a market investigation which, if 
conducted, might have uncovered potential development problems before 
a decision was made to develop the program. 
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As NDI complexity increased, cost-type contracts should be considered. 
Because of Avenger's maturity, a fixed-price contract worked well because 
costs could be determined. SGT York was much more complex, making 
it difficult to determine realistic costs. As costs increased for SGT York, 
the Prime Contractor began to lose interest in SGT York and may have 
tried to cut corners to save money and profits. A cost-type contract for 
SGT York would have helped keep the prime contractor motivated to 
properly finish this complex project. 
Contractor experience is critical to the success of an NDI acquisition 
program. Boeing Aerospace had an enormous amount of experience with 
large Government contracts, especially air defense programs, and this 
experience certainly helped them as they developed Avenger. Ford 
Aerospace had no experience with Air Defense systems. This lack of 
experience may have been a key reason why SGT York had so many 
development problems. 
Program office must ensure NDI components will not require major 
modifications to meet combat situations. SGT York's program office 
expected to utilize the F-16 radar in its original condition. In the ground 
mode, the radar was not as reliable as anticipated, which incurred costs to 
toughen the radar to meet ground combat requirements. Avenger's 
program office correctly used ground combat proven systems like Stinger 
to ensure reliability would remain high and that the program would not 
require major modifications which would increase costs. 
NDI should use the latest technology available. SGT York was designed 
to use an M48A5 chassis and a M60 750 horsepower engine when an Ml 
chassis and engine were available. If SGT York had been fielded, it is 
doubtful whether SGT York could have properly supported an Army 
Heavy Division. Avenger utilized state-of-the-art components so that it 
would not be obsolete once fielded. 
"Skunk works" is appropriate as long as program personnel fully 
understand how to implement it. The SGT York Program Office may 
have lacked the required understanding of "Skunk works." Their "hands- 
off' approach inhibited essential information on system performance and 
program progress from reaching those who made program decisions and 
provided necessary funding. 
Operational testing must be realistic. SGT York's operational test had 
limited realism. These tests did not provide adequate performance data to 
support further funding of SGT York. 
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Table 1 below summarizes these key factors. 
CRITERIA SGT YORK AVENGER 
Mature System - / 
Congressional Support - / 
User Support / / 
DOD Support - / 
Media Support - / 
Proper Tailoring - / 




Contract Type vs. NDI 
Complexity 
- / 








Table 1.  Key Factors Matrix 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that as the Defense budget becomes tighter, the push for NDI acquisition 
programs will continue to increase. Program Managers will need to have a clearer 
understanding of how to successfully manage them. In an effort to help acquisition 
managers to accomplish this task, this thesis examined two NDI programs, SGT York and 
Avenger. The programs were examined to determine key factors that made SGT York's 
program a failure and Avenger's program a success. From the analysis of SGT York 
compared to Avenger many mistakes can be seen in the SGT York program. It is clear 
from this analysis that the level of maturity of a system plays a critical role in the 
tailoring of an NDI acquisition program. Program Managers must be adept in all aspects 
of program management so they can properly implement their programs. 
B. SUMMARY OF LESSONS-LEARNED 
A summary of the lessons-learned from the study of the SGT York and Avenger 
programs is listed below. 
- NDI Acquisition Strategies work well if they are used to produce a mature 
system. 
- The support of Congress, DOD, and the User community is critical to the success 
of any acquisition program. 
- The support of the media is important. 
- Proper tailoring of the acquisition strategy is critical in an NDI acquisition. 
- It is critical that Program Managers fully understand how to properly tailor an 
NDI acquisition. 
- A thorough market investigation is critical when using an NDI acquisition 
strategy. 
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- As NDI complexity increases, cost-type contracts should be considered. 
- Contractor experience is critical to the success of an NDI acquisition program. 
- The Program Office must ensure NDI components will not require major 
modifications to meet combat situations. 
- NDI programs should use the latest technology available. 
- "Skunk works" acquisition is appropriate if the program office understands how 
to properly implement it. 
- Operational testing must be as realistic as possible. 
C.     RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the examination of the SGT York and the Avenger programs, the following 
recommendations are made: 
1. The lessons-learned should be disseminated to current and future program 
management personnel, as well as other DOD acquisition officials. 
2. DOD acquisition officials should ensure that during concept exploration, 
a thorough examination of a proposed major weapon system should be 
conducted to determine if it is appropriate for an NDI acquisition program. 
3. Continued examination of other NDI programs is necessary to broaden the 
knowledge base of NDI acquisitions. 
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APPENDIX.  ACRONYMS 
ACRONYM FULL TITLE 
ABN Airborne 
AC Aircraft 
ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment 
ADA Air Defense Artillery 
ADATS Air Defense Anti-Tank System 
AMC Army Material Command 
ARGADS Army Gun Air Defense System 
ASARC Army Systems Acquisition Review Council 
BDE Brigade 
C2I Command, Control and Intelligence 
CA Combined Arms 
CAV Cavalry 
CE/D Concept Exploration and Definition 
COEA Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
CPIF Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee 
CUCV Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle 
DA Department of the Army 
DAB Defense Acquisition Board 
DEM/VAL Demonstration and Validation 
DIV Division 
DIVADA Division Air Defense Artillery 
DOD Department of Defense 
DODI Department of Defense Instruction 
DSMC Defense Systems Management College 
DTUPC Design-to-Unit-Production-Cost 
EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
EOQ Economic Order Quantity 
FAAD Forward Area Air Defense 
FDT&E Force Development Test and Experimentation 
FFP Firm-Fixed-Price 
FLIR Forward-Looking Infrared 
FPIF Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm Target 
FSED Full-Scale Engineering Development 









































Human Factors Engineering 
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
Interim Contractor Support 
Integrated Logistics Support 
Integrated Logistics Support Plan 
Initial Operational Capability 
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
Light Infantry Division 
Letter of agreement 
Line-of-Sight Forward 
Line-of-Sight Rear 
Low-Rate Initial Production 
Man-Portable Air Defense System 
Missile Command 
Mechanized Infantry Division 
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
Nondevelopmental Item 
Nondevelopmental Item Candidate Evaluation 
New Equipment Training 
Non-Line-of-Sight 
Office of Management and Budget 
Operational Test and Evaluation Agency 
Pre- Planned Product Improvement 
Program Acquisition Unit Cost 
Production and Deployment 
Program Executive Officer/Office 
Predicted Fire Weapon 
Program Manager; Product Manager; Project Managers 
Program Management Office 
Pedestal Mounted Stinger 
Production Qualification Test 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
Request for Proposal 
Required Operational Capability 
Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production 
Surface-to-Air Missile 
Secretary of Defense 
System Improvement Plan 
Standard Vehicle Mounted Launcher 
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TC-LPU Type-Classified Limited Procurement Urgent 
TC-S Type-Classified Standard 
TDP Technical Data Package 
TECOM Test and Evaluation Command 
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 
43 
44 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Defense 
Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures, Washington, DC, February 23, 
1991. 
2. Koropey, Oleh, "It seemed like a great idea at the time" The story of the SGT 
York, Unpublished 1986. 
3. SGT York Project Office, U.S. Army Armament Munitions and Chemical 
Command, (Pentagon), February 1986, "Acquisition Strategy," p. 11, Unpublished. 
4. Department of Defense Inspector General Audit Report: SGT York Division Air 
Defense Gun System, 10 September 1984. 
5. Adam, John, "The SGT York Gun: A Massive Misfire," IEEE Spectrum, 
February 1987. 
6. U.S. General Accounting Office, SGT York: Concerns About the Army's 
Accelerated Acquisition Strategy, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1986. 
7. Interview between Mr. David W. Easterly, Avenger Lead Electrical Design 
Engineer, Boeing Aerospace Company, Defense and Space Group, Missiles and 
Space Division, Huntsville, AL, and the author on September 26, 1994. 
8. Department of the Army, Avenger Product Management Office, U.S. Army 
Missile Command, Avenger Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) 
Report for Avenger, January 10, 1990. 
9. Little, John H., and Michael A. Vane, "ADA Laydown Results, Forward Area Air 
Defense," Air Defense Artillery, Fort Bliss, TX, April 1986. 
10. Interview between Lieutenant Colonel (P) Albert J. Hamilton III, Former Avenger 
Program Manager, Naval Postgraduate School, and the author on various dates 
between May and July of 1994. 
11. Interview between Mr. John Sundberg, Chief of Program Management Office for 
Avenger and a Cost Analyst for SGT York program and the author on 26 
September 1994. 
45 
12. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Missile Command, Avenger Product 
Management Office, Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) for Avenger, Redstone 
Arsenal, AL, January 5, 1990. 
13. Report on the Audit of the SGT York Division Air Defense (DIVAD) Gun 
System, (MICROFICHE), GPO, 1984. 
14. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Warfare of the Committee on 
Armed Services, Oversight on the Division Air Defense Gun System (DIVAD) 
98th Congress., 2d Sess. S. Rept, Washington, DC:  GPO, 1984. 
15. Johnson, Clarence, More Than Mv Share Of It All, Smithsonian Institution Press, 
Washington, DC, 1985. 
16. Parker, Robert Col. (P), DIVAD: What Really Happened, Unpublished September 
20, 1985. 
17. Chen, William S., The SGT York Experience, U.S. Army Armament Munitions 
and Chemical Command, Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ, 1985, Unpublished. 
18. Phone Interview between Mr. Walt Ryba, former Assistant Program Manager, 
Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ, and the author 14 June 1994. 
19. Interview with Mr. Gilbert Stoltz, COEA Cost Analyst for SGT York Combat 
Development Center, Fort Bliss, TX, and the author on 27 September 1994. 
20. Telephone interview with Robert Seamonds, Former Chief Engineer for the SGT 
York Project Manager's Office, U.S. Army Armament Research and Development 
Center, Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ, 20 July 1994. 
21. Koropey, Oleh, COL (R), The Media and the Political Milieu: How the SGT 
York Became the System that Everyone Loved to Hate, Historical Office U.S. 
Army Material Command Alexandria, VA, 1992. 
22. Stearns, Kenneth M., The Avenger Air Defense System: An Examination of the 
Nondevelopmental Item Acquisition Strategy, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, March 1994. 
23. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Missile Command, Stinger Project Office, 
PMS Acquisition Plan and Acquisition Strategy. Redstone Arsenal, AL, May 17, 
1988. 
46 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, VA  22304-6145 
2. Library, Code 52   2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5101 
3. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange 1 
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center 
Fort Lee, VA 23801-6043 
4. OASA (RDA)   1 
ATTN:   SARD-ZAC 
103 Army Pentagon 
Washington, DC  20310-0103 
5. Professor David V. Lamm (Code SM/Lt) 4 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
6. LTC John Dillard, (Code SM/Dj)  1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5103 
7. Professor Michael D. Proctor 1 
449A Alafaya Woods Blvd. 
Oviedo, FL  32765 
8. CPT Russell A. Hinds 2 
2706 Woodside 
Arlington, TX 76016 
47 
